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[Redacted] Chief Ground Forces Branch, SOVA/TF [Redacted]		1/20/82	
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20090054-82  
ER-82-6062/pl

20 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Chief, Ground Forces Branch, SOVA/TF

SUBJECT: CIA-DIA Briefing on Soviet Ground Forces  
Readiness

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum informs you of an activity that may come to your attention during discussions with senior officers at other agencies. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. Background: During the past several days a joint CIA-DIA briefing team has presented the findings of an interagency working group on Soviet Ground Forces readiness to a number of high-level audiences. The team has briefed the Director, Deputy Director, and Vice Director for Production of DIA; Lt. General Gorman, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brigadier General Odom, Army ACSI; and several officials of OSD/PA&E. This week briefings are scheduled for NSA; the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency of the JCS; and officials of OSD/Net Assessment. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] 25X1

3. The analysis was commissioned by the NIO/GPF in response to a request from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in late 1980 and will result in an IIM scheduled for NFIB consideration in June 1982. The briefing presents the results of the interagency working group's analysis and fundamentally changes views of Soviet Ground Forces readiness. Mobilization is expected to take longer than earlier analysis had indicated (up to 7 days vice 3), and it is believed that the Soviets plan for a period of 30 days or more of post-mobilization training for the low strength (cadre) divisions that constitute more than half of the force before they would believe that these units were prepared for effective offensive operations. [REDACTED] 25X1

4. Although the warning implications of this analysis are beyond the scope of the terms of reference for this phase of the project, it is clear that our views of warning of war in Europe will have to be reevaluated. Current judgments assume no post-mobilization training requirements

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and warning is predicated essentially on how quickly forces can be mobilized and moved into position for combat. The new analysis establishes the likelihood of an additional training requirement but acknowledges that some preparations could be conducted in advance through selective call ups, as was done before the invasion of Afghanistan. Translating this into new warning judgments will involve some new analysis of warning indicators and our ability to detect and assess them. [ ]

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5. The time lines at which US military planners expect to be confronted in Europe by numbers of Soviet divisions must also be reevaluated. The current US estimate, NIE 11-14-81, states that 28 Soviet divisions are ready (exclusive of movement) for operations against NATO's central region at M+1 with a total of 65 available [ ]. The new analysis concludes that it will take much longer to get these same units ready for commitment to offensive operations: 28 at [ ] 32 [ ] 36 at [ ] 60 at [ ] and 65 [ ]

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6. Two of the senior officers we have briefed already have expressed their concern that this analysis could be used to curtail some defense initiatives designed to improve US readiness on the basis of an argument that, since the Russians are not as "ready" as we previously thought, we are less pressed to improve ourselves. We have responded that this analysis, on the other hand, presents a more realistic appreciation of the threat and could offer US planners some hope that remedial actions could be effective. In any event, we recognize the far-reaching implications of our findings and are proceeding to document the analysis thoroughly and to encourage the widest possible analytical review of our work. [ ]

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7. [ ], who is my DIA counterpart and the chairman of the working group, and I can brief you at your convenience [ ]

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